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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the intertemporal linkages between FDI and disaggregated
measures of international trade. We outline a model exemplifying some of these linkages, describe
several methods for investigating two-way feedbacks between various categories of trade, and apply
them to the recent experience of developing countries. After controlling for other macroeconomic
and institutional effects, we find that the strongest feedback between the sub-accounts is between
FDI and manufacturing trade. More precisely, applying Geweke (1982)’s decomposition method,
we find that most of the linear feedback between trade and FDI (81%) can be accounted for by
Granger-causality from FDI gross flows to trade openness (50%) and from trade to FDI (31%). The
rest of the total linear feedback is attributable to simultaneous correlation between the two annual
series.
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1.   Introduction 
A growing literature has recognized the existence of two-way feedbacks between 
financial flows and trade for developing countries.  Yet, it is clear that aggregate 
measures of both financial flows and trade openness mask important differences between 
the various components of both measures.  It is reasonable to expect that the linkages 
between FDI and trade in goods will be strong (and possibly bi-directional), but it is less 
evident whether the impact of trade on FDI should be different for, for example, countries 
in different stages of development or whether inflows and outflows of FDI react 
differently with different types of goods trade flows. This paper aims to provide 
preliminary answers to such questions with the help of both theoretical modeling and an 
empirical estimation of these relationships.  
We investigate linkages between finance and trade with more disaggregated 
measures of both. Such dis-aggregation allows us to identify the salient features of the 
feedback effects.  We describe several methods for investigating two ways feedbacks 
between various categories of trade, and apply them to the recent experience of 
developing countries.  We find that the strongest feedback between the sub-accounts is 
between FDI and manufacturing trade.  Specifically, applying Geweke (1982)’s 
decomposition method, we find that most of the linear feedback between trade and FDI 
(81%) can be accounted for by Granger-causality from FDI gross flows to trade openness 
(50%) and from trade to FDI (31%). The rest of the total linear feedback is attributable to 
simultaneous correlation between the two annual series. Similar results are obtained when 
we instead investigate causality between trade openness and net FDI flows or net inflows.    2
We also consider other linkages between the sub-accounts of the current and the financial 
accounts and generally find them significantly less important.   
     In Section 2 we discuss the theoretical literature and present a model on the 
possible links between FDI and trade. In section 3 we discuss the state of the empirical 
literature on the subject while section 4 presents our findings for disaggregated measures 
of FDI and trade flows. Section 5 focuses on the question of causality and section 6 
concludes the paper with further interpretive remarks and by outlining several avenues 
for future research.  
 
2.  Model 
One of the more robust links between finance and trade in developing countries is 
through vertical FDI.  We should expect two ways feedbacks between trade and FDI, 
possibly because both would increase due to similar reasons, like higher factor 
productivity, better institutions, growing markets, etc.
1
Below we describe a model of production by multinationals that fragment their 
production optimally, and benefit from the cost advantage associated with locating labor-
intensive production stages in labor abundant countries. A by-product of this 
fragmentation is the growth of two-way trade: higher imports of primary and intermediate 
products, followed by higher exports of the improved/final products. Multinationals will 
opt to locate the production in the developing countries that offer the highest 
productivity/wage ratio.  A developing country experiencing rapid improvement in its 
productivity, due to accumulation of human capital, learning by doing, or better   3
institution will attract growing inflows of vertical FDI, increasing thereby its international 
trade.  In circumstances where the multinational employ skilled workers in the 
developing country, the greater volume of trade that comes with the vertical FDI opt to 
increase the demand for skilled workers, increasing thereby the return to human capital in 
the developing country.  This in turn will increase overtime the supply of skilled workers, 
potentially increasing future FDI .    
We consider a global economy composed of 2 blocks of countries, H and F, each 
consuming two types final goods -- a homogeneous one, Z, and n heterogeneous goods, 
denoted by  , i = 1, …, n. The F block is composed of developing countries, differing 
in labor productivity.  Asterisks signify F variables. The utility of the H consumers at 
time t is a semi-additive function of the two goods 
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The intertemporal utility is the conventional net present value of the temporal utilities, 
discounted applying the subjective rate of time preferences.  Similar preferences 
characterize consumers in country F.  The supply of labor in each block is inelastic and 
Good Z is produced using a simple Ricardian technology.  In H, this technology is  
(2)                            Z = Lz.                                                                               
We normalize the price of good Z to one, so the real wage is one in the competitive 
equilibrium.   
For concreteness, we focus on one of the developing country, where the 
technology in the homogenous sector is: 
                                                                                                                                                              
1   Gordon et. al. (2001) shows that vertical FDI from the OECD to developing countries has 
increased substantially in the last twenty years. This increase has been paralleled with a corresponding   4
(3)                                       ,                                                               
* * *
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where the parameter a  is the productivity of foreign labor and the real wage is  .  
The homogenous good, Z, is a composite good, characterized by stable and mature 
technology, with limited prospects for future productivity improvements.  In contrast, Y 
goods are relatively high tech goods, the outcome of multinationals’ R&D.  Unlike good 
Z, producing intermediate Y inputs in country F is likely to increase F’s productivity 
overtime.  Due to the reasons elaborated in the literature dealing with vertical FDI, 
multinationals producing Y goods frequently fragment vertically their production line 





produced in a vertical mode, where production is fragmented geographically. The final 
production stage is done at H, using intermediate inputs produced in F at an earlier stage, 
at the developing county that offers the most cost effective production line.  The 
intermediate input,  , can be produced in the foreign country at time t using a Cobb-
Douglas production technology   
i M
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where   is the labor employed,   is labor productivity in the foreign intermediate-
good sector.  The final production stage combines the intermediate input   and H 
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increase in trade flows. 
2 The analysis can be extended to a general CES function.  Of course, the Leontief technology simplifies 
the math.  It may be also a reasonable assumption in manufacturing industries where, by design, there are 
fixed proportions [like auto body produced in Mexico, engine in the US, etc.].    5
The fragmented production process requires the multinational to invest in two 
plants, resulting in a periodic set-up cost of   at each country.  This cost may be viewed 
as the periodic investment needed to sustain the production capacity. We assume that 
goods  are ordered such that a higher index i is associated with higher periodic set-up 
cost.  We consider the case where, due to learning by doing and accumulation of human 
capital, the developing country’s labor employed in activities   becomes more 
productive --  .  To simplify, we take first the productivity improvement as an 
exogenous process.  Each period, the multinational allocates the production of the 
intermediate output   to the developing country that is the most cost effective.  To 
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Applying (1), the demand for good Y in each country is 
(6)                          . 1
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The total demand facing the multinational is  , where q stands for a scale measure of 
the number of countries composing the global economy. 
d
i qY
Assuming that good i is produced, it follows from (4) and (5) that employment 
levels in the final and the intermediate production stages of good i are:  
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The monopoly profits are 
  (8)                                       . 2 *
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Substituting (6)-(7) into (8), we find that    6
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Hence,   is determined by the real wages and by the efficiency of the labor in H and F, 
where   
i k
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The multinational allocates the production of the intermediate product i to the 
developing country characterized by the highest normalized productivity/wage ratio (i.e., 
the highest  ).   Hence, a developing country that gains productivity in activity i at a 
rate that exceeds its competitors will attract overtime more FDI.  The exports of such a 
country would increase both due to the higher production level of the infra marginal 
goods, and the introduction of new, relatively high   goods.   
* * /a b
i C
Our analysis assumed so far that the productivity improvements are exogenous, as 
will be the case if productivity is only impacted by exogenous accumulation of human 
capital.  One can extend our model to account for endogenous accumulation of human 
capital, allowing for heterogonous labor force.  Specifically, suppose that the there are 
two labor types, skilled and unskilled.  Unskilled labor is employable only in sector Z, 
whereas skilled workers have the option of employment at sector Y.  The economy starts   7
with relative scarcity of skilled labor.  Unskilled workers may become skilled workers 
following the accumulation of human capital, a process that is associated with time and 
resource costs.  In such an economy, higher trade implies also higher demand for skilled 
workers, inducing more unskilled workers to acquire human capital.  Consequently, 
greater abundance of skilled workers would increase the economy’s attractiveness to 
multinationals.  Higher trade would tend to increase the demand for skilled workers, 
increasing overtime the supply of skilled workers, increasing thereby the future 
attractiveness of the country for multinational FDI.  Appendix A outlines a specific 
example of a model where such feedbacks are at work.  We consider the case where 
mobility of workers from sector Z to Y is limited and costly.  Specifically, we assume 
that workers in the developing country can move from to the Y sector only after paying a 
switching cost, the sum of investment in human capital, and other reallocation costs.  
These costs are worker specific, and are assumed to be known to each agent.  In these 
circumstances, the supply of labor in activity Y is segmented in the short run from the 
supply of labor in activity Z, and wages are sector specific,  .  Workers would 
switch from sector Z to Y when the net present value of the future wage gap,   
exceeds the switching costs.  In an economy where the wage gap is anticipated to grow in 
favor of sector Y, agents with lower switching costs will move earlier.  The supply of 
labor in sector Y is composed of workers that have switched already.  Consequently, 
higher productivity in sector Y (induced by higher investment in that sector Y, learning 
by doing, etc.) would increase the wages in sector Y.  This in turn would induce more 
agents to switch to sector Y, encouraging overtime further investment in sector Y. 
*
,
*; y t w a
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Arguably, India’s recent trade history is a case study exemplifying these trends.  
The education system in India has been known for producing highly qualified engineers.  
In the 1970s-1980s, the options available to these engineers in India were rather limited, 
implying that relatively low domestic demand imposed a constraint on the effective 
supply of engineers.  The recent advances of telecommunication and the Internet reduced 
drastically the cost of trade in information services.  The direct outcome has been sizable 
increase in trade in services, putting in motion a two way feedback process.  The greater 
export of services from India increased the return for education in India, increasing 
overtime the supply of human capital, and the attractiveness of India for future FDI, etc... 
The observed positive association between trade and finance may also be the 
outcome of other processes, such as political-economy factors. Rajan and Zingales 
(2003), for example, propose an interest group theory of financial development whereby 
incumbents oppose financial development because it breeds competition.  In these 
circumstances, the incumbents’ opposition will be weaker when an economy allows both 
cross-border trade and capital flows.  They predict that a country’s domestic financial 
development should be positively correlated with trade openness, and identify the time 
varying nature of this association. Another alternative channel, operating in the same 
direction from finance to trade, might be due to reliance of international trade on trade 
credits. Greater openness to trade credit flows, leads to a decrease in the cost of this credit 
and thereby increases international trade.
3
 
                                                      
3   See Helpman and Razin (1978) for an integrated theory of trade in goods and securities. For a 
similar argument on the impact of services liberalization on goods trade see Blyde and Sinyavskaya (2004).   9
3.  The Empirical Literature
A number of recent papers have examined the interactions between financial 
flows and trade (See Albuquerque et al., in press, Do and Levchenko, 2004, Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, 2004, Rose and Spiegel, 2004, Swenson, 2004). Most prominent in this 
literature is the argument that a larger inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) will lead 
to higher volume of trade as well as other benefits such as increased rates of total factor 
productivity growth or higher output growth rates.   
Aizenman and Noy (2004) examine de-facto measures of financial and trade 
openness, and show that aggregate financial and commercial openness measures are 
closely linked.  They empirically decompose causality and find strong affects in both 
directions. Anther approach linking trade and financial openness is Portes and Rey 
(2003), showing that both international trades in goods and in assets are explained by 
similar gravity regressions.  Their work highlights the role of information flows and 
frictions in accounting for trade in goods and assets. Aviat and Coeurdacier (2004) extend 
the methodology of Portes and Rey (2003), and investigate the geography of trade in 
goods and asset holdings. They find that the causality between bilateral asset holdings 
and trade in goods runs significantly in both ways and that these effects are strong. Other 
recent work that discuss financial flows or FDI more specifically is Agénor (2003), 
Blonigen and Wang (2004), Chan and Gemayel (2004), Edison and Warnock (2003), 
Harrison et al. (2004), Lane (2003), and Razin et al. (2003). 
 
 
   10
4.  Data, Methodology and Results 
This section reviews the data, the methodology we employ and our main results on 
the determinants of various measures of financial and trade openness and causality 
between them.  We begin by describing the data. We next discuss the model we estimate 
for the determination of FDI flows and trade and finally examine the question of 
causality.  Appendix B provides a detailed summary of the variables, sources and 
samples described in this section.   
 
4.1 The  data 
We measure de facto financial openness using the sum of total capital inflows and 
outflows (in absolute values) measured as a percent of gross domestic product. Capital 
flows are the sum of FDI, portfolio flows, trade credits and loans. We construct an 
openness index for each one of these flour components and briefly discuss them below. 
We then focus on FDI openness in our estimations. The data on financial flows is taken 
from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics dataset. These measures of financial 
openness are exactly analogous to the standard measure of commercial openness (sum of 
exports and imports as percent of GDP), which we investigate as well.  
We sub-divide the standard measure of commercial openness into openness for 
trade in goods, trade in services and trade in incomes. We further divide trade in goods 
into openness measures for trade in foodstuffs, in fuel, in manufacturing and in 
metals/ores. This data is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. We 
provide descriptive statistics and then incorporate them in our estimations.   11
In table 1 we describe our data for financial and commercial openness. 
Specifically, table 1A presents averages for financial openness disaggregated by type 
(FDI, loans, trade credits and equity flows) for the 1980s and 1990s.
4 We divide our 
country sample into industrialized and developing countries. A number of observations 
merit discussion at this point. First, one can observe a dramatic increase (doubling) of 
FDI in the 1990s as compared to the previous decade. This trend is more pronounced for 
the developing countries whose inflows of FDI went up from an average of about 1% of 
GDP to almost 3% (most of this increase appears to have come from a large increase in 
FDI outflows from the industrial countries). Portfolio flows have also seen a dramatic 
increase (more pronounced for the industrialized countries) while trade credits and the 
amount of loan flows have not changed that much in the last two decades (as % of GDP). 
Table 1B records descriptive statistics for trade flows (disaggregated by type, 
countries’ income levels and decades). Apparent is the relative stability of most measures 
of trade openness in both developing and developed countries.  Exception are a large 
increase in the volume of trade in manufactures for developing countries and a large 
decrease in trade in fuels for both samples.
5 Interestingly, on average, developing 
countries appear to be more open to trade in both goods (across all types) and services 
than our sample of industrialized countries. 
Table 2 presents correlation coefficients between our financial openness measures 
and the commercial/trade openness measures disaggregated by types of flows. The only 
notable correlations are a significant correlation of FDI flow measures with goods and 
services trade (especially trade in manufactures and fuels) for developing countries and a 
                                                      
4   The 1990s include data up to and including 1998. Because we limit our data to 1998, our data does 
not completely reflect the slowdown in capital flows following the Asian crisis.   12
much weaker association between FDI flows and trade in industrialized countries. Other 
significant and noteworthy correlations are between trade in goods and trade in services 
(for both samples) and a high correlation between equity flows and FDI flows for the 
industrialized countries sample. 
In our estimations, we include several control variables that are described below. 
This list is based on our previous research (Aizenman and Noy, 2004) and recent 
empirical work on FDI (especially Albuquerque et al., 2005 and Blonigen and Wang, 
2004). In order to ensure our results are not driven by a ‘missing variables’ bias, we 
include a host of macroeconomic control variables. In all regressions we use per capita 
gross domestic product (measured in PPP dollars), a domestic interest rate spread (from a 
world rate of interest), and a weighted average of G3 growth rates. In an initial 
specification, we also included the government’s budget surplus (as % of GDP), the 
inflation rate (CPI), a world interest rate (U.S 1-year T-bill rate), the government’s 
budget surplus, gross domestic product (in $1995), and government consumption (as % 
of GDP). Neither of these was significant and all were dropped from the specifications 
we report.
 6 All the macroeconomic data are taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators and the IMF’s International Finance Statistics. 
For the political-economy determinants of financial openness, we concentrate our 
empirical investigation on two political-institutional measures. Aizenman and Noy (2004) 
discuss the motivation behind the inclusion of political variables in the estimation of 
                                                                                                                                                              
5 At the very least, part of the reason for this decline is average lower oil prices during the 1990s. 
6   In Aizenman and Noy (2003) we found a disparity between the impacts of budget surplus in 
developing and OECD countries which may be explained by the differential cyclical patterns of fiscal 
policy.  In contrast to the OECD countries, fiscal policy tends to be pro-cyclical in developing countries. 
Financial crises tend to lead to recessions in developing countries, inducing abrupt fiscal adjustment, 
reducing fiscal deficits.  These observations may lead to the positive association between smaller budget   13
financial openness. We first include a variable that measures the degree of democratic 
rule. Our democracy index is taken from the Polity IV project and ranges from -10 (fully 
autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic).
7  
In addition, for our second political-economic control, following the work of Wei 
(2000) and Dreher and Siemers (2003), we examine whether corruption matters for the 
degree of financial openness. To that end, we use a measure of corruption that is taken 
from the International Country Risk Guide. The data are available in monthly 
observations. We obtain annual observations from 1982 onward by averaging the 
monthly data points for each year. This index ranges from  -6 (low probability/risk of 
encountering corruption) to 0 (high risk of corruption). Two other political variables that 
were initially included but later dropped due to their insignificance were a measure of 
political risk (from the ICRG data) and a measure of government unity (taken from the 
World Bank’s Dataset on Political Institutions 2000). 
In order to examine whether the occurrence of financial crises contaminates our 
result, as they might systematically change the relationship between financial openness 
and our control variables, we also include crises measures in a number of regressions. 
Crisis measures were never significant. 
As the theoretical discussion in Aizenman and Noy (2004) suggests, one of the 
determinants of de facto financial openness should be the legal impediments to financial 
flows (de jure financial openness). Accordingly, we also attempted to include in our 
                                                                                                                                                              
deficits and lower de facto financial openness [see Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi (1996), Aizenman, 
Gavin and Hausmann (2000) and Talvi and Vegh (2000)]. 
7   The “Polity IV database includes annual measures for both institutionalized democracy (DEMOC) 
and autocracy (AUTOC), as many polities exhibit qualities of both these distinct authority patterns….A 
third indicator, POLITY, is derived simply by subtracting the AUTOC value from the DEMOC value; this 
procedure provides a single regime score that ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy).”   14
multivariate analysis a binary measure for restrictions on the capital account taken from 
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. This 
binary measure is the only internationally comparable measure of de jure financial 
openness available for a large sample of countries and over the time period.  
A priori, we see no reason to restrict our sample and therefore attempted to 
include all 205 countries and territories for which data are available in the 2001 edition of 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Our control variables, though, 
are available for only a subset of this group. Most importantly, most of the data on FDI 
flows are typically available only from the 1980s and only for a much smaller set of 
countries. Our data set is therefore an annual panel of 83 countries for the years 1982-
1998. 
Blonigen and Wang (2004) argue that pooling developed and developing 
countries in empirical studies of this type is inappropriate and likely to lead to misleading 
results. We also hypothesize that results for industrialized/developed countries might be 
different from those for developing countries as the nature of FDI in these groups might 
be different; for example vertical vs. horizontal FDI. We thus repeat our regressions for 
developed economies – which we define as those economies that were members of the 
OECD in 1990 – and developing countries. Developing countries are defined by 
excluding OECD countries and island economies (as these are often used as off-shore 
banking centers and their level of de facto openness to financial flows is often 
dramatically different from other countries in the same income level). For a summary of 
                                                                                                                                                              
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2000, p. 12). We use the POLITY variable in our regressions. In Aizenman and Noy 
(2003), we also use other measures of political competition to verify the robustness of this result.   15
the information described in this section including detailed data sources and sample sizes, 
see Appendix B.  
  
4.2  Methodology and Estimation Results 
We start by positing a linear structure for the determination of the level of 
financial openness whereby: 
(13)  1 12 [] [] it it it it FDI T X CO T α ββ − =+ + + ε   
The dependent variable [(FDIit(T)], FDI openness for country i at time t and type T 
(gross, net, inflow, or outflow), is assumed to be dependent on separate country 
intercepts, a vector Xit of macroeconomic and political-institutional control variables, a 
vector of average lagged trade openness measures [ 1 − it CO (T)] , and an error term. The 
variables examined are described below.  
While in Aizenman and Noy (2004), we found strong evidence of autocorrelation 
in the aggregate financial openness measure; this is not the case for estimations of the 
different components of financial openness. We therefore estimate the model with a 
standard fixed-effects least-squares methodology. 
 
Table 3A and 3B include results for our basic regressions. The adjusted R
2 is 
between 0.47 and 0.71 depending on the list of macroeconomic controls, the LHS trade 
variables used and the sample (industrial/developing). In table 3A, we report results of 
regressions that exclude the macroeconomic and political control variables. Only GDP 
per capita and a dummy for the 1990s are included besides the trade variables of interest 
to us in this paper. We find that the coefficient for per-capita GDP is always positive and   16
statistically significant – i.e., an increase in domestic per capita GDP of PPP$1000 will 
facilitate 0.2-0.4 percentage points increase in the volume of FDI flows (as percent of 
GDP). A dummy variable for the 1990s is consistently positive and significant for the 
developing countries and negative but only occasionally significant for the industrial 
countries sample. 
The association between FDI gross flows and trade is positive and significant at 
the 1% level for the developing countries sample and is apparently positive but 
insignificant for the developed countries (columns 1-2 in table 3A). A decomposition of 
our measure of trade openness into trade in goods, in services, and in incomes however, 
yields very similar statistically significant results for the two samples; with trade in goods 
dominating the association between trade and FDI flows (columns 3-4 in table 3A). 
Services trade is never statistically significant for either sample nor in the different 
specifications for tables 3A and 3B. Interestingly, in table 3B columns 3-4, the 
association between goods trade and FDI openness and trade in incomes and FDI 
openness is twice as strong and statistically significant while that is no longer the case for 
the industrial economies.  
Results for other macroeconomic and political control variables are reported in 
table 3B. The coefficient for the interest rate spread is negative for developing countries 
and positive for industrial ones but is rarely statistically significant. Foreign growth rates 
are positive and significant for developing countries but negative and insignificant for 
developed ones. The political-economy determinants of international financial flows, 
corruption levels and the democracy measure are never statistically distinguishable from 
zero in our regression specifications. The democratic regime variable is consistently   17
negative, in line with our previous findings on aggregate measures of financial openness. 
Since we use a fixed-effects specification these results are not surprising, as these 
measures tend to be fairly constant over time.
8  
In table 4, we go on and further break down our measures for trade into trade in 
services, incomes and four categories of goods trade (foodstuffs, fuel, metals/ores and 
manufacturing). In columns 1-2 we report the stripped down specification without macro-
controls. As reported above, the positive and significant relationships between the GDP 
per capital variable, the 1990s decade dummy, and the dependent variable (FDI gross 
flows) are robust to any inclusion or exclusion of trade variables. As also reported in 
table 3B for developing countries, the association between trade in services and FDI 
flows is negative (and significant in columns 1 and 5) for that sub-sample. The 
association of FDI with trade in incomes is positive and occasionally significant for the 
developing countries sample. For this sample, we now also find that the association 
between FDI gross flows and goods trade is due mostly to an association of FDI flows 
with trade in foodstuffs. Intriguingly, the association of FDI with trade in fuels is 
negative and significant; this result also holds for industrial economies. Trade in 
manufacturing is the only trade openness measure that is consistently significant and 
positive for developed economies (it is insignificant for the developing countries sample). 
In columns 5-6 of table 4, we add a binary variable for capital account 
restrictions. As might be predicted, restricting the capital account reduces significantly 
the openness to FDI flows for both developing and industrial countries. 
                                                      
8   In Aizenman and Noy (2003), we present significant results for these measures when fixed effects 
are not included.   18
In table 5, we re-estimate our benchmark specifications with different left-hand-
side FDI variables. In columns 1 and 3 we examine FDI inflows while in columns 2 and 
4, outflows. For the trade openness measures, the only variable that is consistently 
significant, as before, is goods trade for the inflows specifications (columns 1 and 3). 
Trade does not appear to explain FDI net outflows. 
In addition to the specifications discussed above, we tested a number of 
alternative specifications of our empirical model in order to verify the robustness of our 
results. Because of space considerations we do not include the full specifications in our 
tables but all these results are available upon request. As we already noted in the previous 
section, we tested the significance of a number of other control variables and found none 
to have any explanatory power. We also hypothesized that financial crises (either banking 
or currency crises) might significantly affect the level of financial openness in general 
and more specifically the use of financial repression for generating government revenues. 
Interestingly, in all iterations of the model we attempted, none of the coefficients for the 







                                                      
9   We utilized a number of variants of these binary indicators (currency crisis and banking crisis, 
their onset year only, and these separately or together in the same specification) and we never reject the null 
(no effect). For currency crises, our indicator is identified by periods in which an index, composed of a 
weighted average of the real exchange rate and foreign reserves, changed dramatically – by more than 2 
standard deviations. This measure is described in detail and evaluated in Hutchison and Noy (2002). The 
banking crisis binary indicator is taken from Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) and is analyzed in Arteta and 
Eichengreen (2002) and Hutchison and Noy (forthcoming).   19
5.  Reverse Causality from finance to trade 
5.1 Reverse  Specifications 
In the previous section we have established that past trade openness Granger-
causes FDI gross flows openness (see Granger, 1969 and Sims, 1972 for a definition of 
G-causality). As we already suggested that causality might also run from past financial 
openness to present trade openness we also estimate the opposite specification: 
(14)  1 12 [] [ ] it it it it CO goods X FO T γ δδ − =+ + + η  
Where the LHS variable is now the openness to goods trade while on the RHS we 
include a set of control variables (chosen incrementally with the Akaike Information 
Criterion) and various measures of financial openness (FDI, loans, equity and trade 
credits). The measures for trade credits and portfolio flows are not reported for many 
countries so we subsequently drop them in the specifications reported in columns 3-4 and 
thus increase the sample size significantly. We use the same assumptions, methodology, 
definition of variables and samples as before. Results are reported in table 6. The FDI 
openness measure appears to have a statistically significant, positive, and large effect on 
trade in goods while for the developing-countries sample the measure of gross loans 
appears to have the opposite effect (reducing goods trade).  
 
5.2  Decomposition of Causality 
In Granger (1969), the possibility of simultaneous causality between the two time 
series is assumed away by arguing that, at least in principle, it should be feasible to obtain 
higher frequency observations and thus identify accurately the exact chronology of 
effects and do away with the correlations in the contemporaneous data series. As we only   20
have annual data, and since financial flows respond quickly to exogenous shocks, it is 
reasonable to expect that our data will also contain what appears to be instantaneous 
causality between trade and financial openness. Furthermore, Granger’s (1969) approach 
does not allow us to estimate and compare the relative magnitudes of causality between 
the two time series. 
Geweke (1982) suggests a methodology to distinguish between (temporal) 
causality from x to y, from y to x and simultaneous causality between the two. We briefly 
describe the methodology and provide results.
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Next, following Geweke’s (1982) notation we define  as the linear feedback 




→  as the G-causality from FDI 
openness to trade openness, and 
FDI CO F
• as the instantaneous linear feedback between the 
                                                      
10   Readers may also consult Geweke (1984) and Granger (1988). The only applications we are aware 
of which apply this methodology to macro-economic data series are Chong and Calderón (2000), Calderón 
and Liu (2003) and Aizenman and Noy (2004). Other approaches to identifying causality in   21
two series. 
, FDI CO F , defined as the total measure of linear dependence between the two 
series is therefore given by: 
(20) 
, FDI CO FDI CO CO FDI FDI CO FFFF
→→ =++
• .  
Given these definitions, Geweke (1982) concludes the following: 
(21) 
54 log[var( )/var( )]
FDI CO it it F ε ε
→ =  
(22) 
32 log[var( )/ var( )]
CO FDI it it F ε ε
→ =  
(23) 
21 log[var( )/ var( )]
FDI CO it it F ε ε
• =  
Geweke (1982) shows that the null hypothesis (H0: F=0) can be statistically 
examined using the χ
2 distribution. In estimating (15)-(19), we started with three lags 
(p=3) of the independent variables in each regression and reduced step-wise the number 
of lags using the Akaike Information criterion. In all cases, it turned out that a single lag 
(p=1) contained all the information required to estimate the model. Consequently, we set 
p=1 throughout. Table 7 provides our results for this decomposition of causality between 
the two series for the complete sample. Most of the linear feedback between trade and 
FDI (81%) can be accounted for by Granger-causality from FDI gross flows to trade 
openness (50%) and from trade to FDI (31%). Simultaneous correlation between the two 
only accounts for 19% of the total linear feedback between the two series. Similar results 
are obtained when we instead investigate causality between trade openness and net FDI 
flows or net inflows. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
macroeconomics will typically rely on an instrumental variable methodology. An excellent book length 
treatment of the issue of causality in macroeconomics is Hoover (2001).   22
6.  Concluding remarks 
Our analysis indicates that there are complex two-way positive feedbacks between 
FDI and international trade.  It suggests the presence of large benefits associated with 
reducing restrictions to trade.  We close the paper by noting that our model and empirical 
work can be extended to account for more complex aspects of the association between 
FDI and trade.  For example, we ignore the potential importance of private and public 
infrastructure investment as an input into the production process, and the role of financial 
intermediation in facilitating domestic investment.  All these considerations are left for 
future research.   23
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Appendix A  
 
Heterogeneous supply of labor and switching costs 
 
 
  This Appendix outlines a model where the supply of labor in each sector is 
determined by the anticipated wage path.  We consider the case where workers in the 
emerging markets are drawn from the unity interval, ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ j .  Agent j can switch to the 
heterogonous sector, Y, only after spending switching cost  1 0 ; ≤ ≤ j j θ .  This cost 
represents investment in human capital and other costs associated with moving from Z to Y.  
Workers are ordered according to the switching costs from sector Z to sector Y.  Hence, 
for  ,   0 1 ≥ > ≥ h l h l θ θ > .   We simplify by assuming that the switching cost is known to each 
agent, and that it takes one period to make the switch.  We assume that the productivity in sector 
Y increases overtime due to learning by doing and technological improvements, while labor 
productivity in the homogenous sector remains constant at .  Recalling that the production 
function in sector Z is Ricardian, wages there are determined by productivity,  .  In 
contrast, productivity improvements in sector Y imply . In a rational 
expectation equilibrium where the anticipated path of wages in sector Y is  , 
agent j will switch at a time t  where  
* a
* *














, + + t y t y t y w w w
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We denote by  the marginal agent that is indifferent between switching at time t and time t+1.  
The anticipation of further increases in the wage offered in sector Y implies 
) (t j
)... 2 ( ) 1 ( ) ( + ≤ + ≤ t j t j t j   In a discrete time model, the mass of workers reallocating to sector 
Y at t is , and the supply of labor in the two sectors is  ) 1 ( ) ( − − t j t j
 




, t j L t j L
j t z t y − = − =
 
Let the aggregate demand for labor in sector Y at time t be  .  It can be verified that  
*
,t Ly D  26










where n denotes the number of Y activities located in the emerging market at time t, and the signs 
above the variables correspond to the sign of the partial derivatives.   Hence,   is determined 




    ( A 4 )       .  ) 1 (
*
, − = t j D t Ly
 
Learning by doing and technological improvement in sector Y would induce higher wages, 
attracting more workers to switch to sector Y.  These trends will also increase the multinationals 
investment in the economy, increasing n overtime. 
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Appendix B – Data Sources and Samples 
Code Source  Description 
KTOTAL  IMF-BOP statistics a Sum of capital inflows and outflows (% of GDP) 
FDITOT  IMF-BOP statistics  Sum of FDI inflows and outflows (% of GDP) 
TRADTOT  IMF-BOP statistics  Sum of trade credit inflows and outflows (% of GDP) 
LOANTOT  IMF-BOP statistics  Sum of loan inflows and outflows (% of GDP) 
EQTOT  IMF-BOP statistics  Sum of portfolio inflows and outflows (% of GDP) 
TRADG  WB-WDI b Sum of exports and imports (% of GDP) 
SERVG  WB-WDI  Sum of service exports and imports (% of GDP) 
GOODG  WB-WDI  Sum of goods exports and imports (% of GDP) 
INCOMG  WB-WDI  Sum of trade in incomes (% of GDP) 
FUELG  WB-WDI  Sum of trade in fuels (% of GDP) 
MANUG  WB-WDI  Sum of trade in manufacturing(% of GDP) 
FOODG  WB-WDI  Sum of trade in foodstuffs (% of GDP) 
METALG  WB-WDI  Sum of trade in metals and ores (% of GDP) 
GDPPCPP  WB-WDI  GDP per capita, PPP (current int’l $) 
DLCPI  WB-WDI  Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
BDGTG  WB-WDI  Overall budget deficit (% of GDP) 
USTBILL  IMF-IFSc Interest rate on U.S. Treasury bill 
CORRUPT  PRS: International Country Risk Guide  Level of Corruption d
POLITY2  POLITY IV project  Political regime type e
KKCCAR IMF- EAER f Binary measure for current and/or capital account restrictions 
Samples (1982-1998) g
ALL  All countries for which data was available (81 countries) 
IND  Industrialized countries (21 countries) 
DEV  Developing countries – defined as all countries excluding OECD member countries (60 countries) 
a The IMF’s Balance-of-Payments Statistics. 
b The World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
c The IMF’s International Finance Statistics. 
d This index runs from -6 (low probability/risk of encountering corruption) to 0 (highly corrupt). 
e The index runs between -10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic). 
f The IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions; extended to 1998 by 
Glick and Hutchison (forthcoming). 
g Data availability further constrained our samples. Thus, the numbers reflect countries for which data 
were available for the aggregate financial flows but not necessarily for specific components (and not 
necessarily for the whole 1982-1998 time period).   28
Table 1A. Financial Openness By Type – Descriptive Statistics 
  Developing countries  Industrialized countries 
  1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s 
FDI  1.71 3.44 1.97 3.76 
FDI  inflows  1.07 2.85 1.03 1.87 
FDI  outflows  0.29 0.40 1.13 1.92 
FDI  net-flows  0.92 2.60 0.13 0.06 
Trade  Credits  1.49 1.68 0.67 0.51 
Portfolio  Flows  1.18 2.20 2.90 6.41 
Loans  5.97 5.44 3.26 3.18 
The table presents averages of sum of financial inflows and outflows (divided by types) as 




Table 1B. Trade Openness By Type – Descriptive Statistics 
  Developing countries  Industrialized countries 
 1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s 
Trade in Incomes  9.14 9.07 9.19 12.51 
Trade in Services  20.79 22.76 15.36 17.36 
Trade in Goods  66.31 61.69 52.25 51.80 
Trade in manufacturing  28.84 37.78 34.85 38.95 
Trade in foodstuffs  13.42 11.19 7.73 6.95 
Trade in fuels  24.09 9.82 6.94 3.37 
Trade in metals/ores  2.98 2.46 2.09 1.79 
The table presents averages of sum of commercial inflows and outflows (divided by types) as 
percent of GDP. Data from the World Development Indicators. 


























Equity flows  1  0.06  0.40 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.13 -0.04 0.13 -0.02
Trade credits    1    0.02 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.07 -0.03
Loan flows     1 0.15 0.13 0.21 0.72  -0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.07



























Equity flows  1  0.03  0.26 0.63 0.13 0.09 0.30 0.34 0.03 -0.20 0.01
Trade credits    1    0.13 0.04 0.15 0.15 -0.16 0.20 0.03 0.23 0.07
Loan flows     1 0.30 0.17 0.17 0.44  0.28 0.04 -0.07 -0.01
FDI flows          1 0.20 0.05 0.33 0.36 0.17 -0.01 0.15


















































Akaike IC  4.70 3.25 4.78 4.30 
Observations  1341 318 1446 468 
Adjusted R
2
0.47 0.63 0.47 0.52 
t-statistics for all variables are given in parentheses. We denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 
1% with *, ** and *** respectively. The LHS variable is the sum of FDI net inflows and outflows (as % 
of GDP). Estimation using least squares with country fixed effects. For definitions of variables, see 
Appendix B.   1

























































Trade openness index…  


















Akaike IC  4.72 3.22 4.74 3.58 
Observations  533 193 541 235 
Adjusted R
2
0.58 0.71 0.55 0.67 
t-statistics for all variables are given in parentheses. We denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 
1% with *, ** and *** respectively. The LHS variable is the sum of FDI net inflows and outflows (as % 
of GDP). Estimation using least squares with country fixed effects. For definitions of variables, see 
Appendix B. In an initial specification, we also included the government’s budget surplus (as % of GDP), 
the inflation rate (CPI), a world interest rate (U.S 1-year T-bill rate), government consumption (as % of 
GDP). 
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Trade openness in…  
(Average for t-1,…,t-4)   
 










































































Akaike IC  4.54 4.40 4.70 3.54 4.69 3.49
Observations  685 330 437 260 437 251
Adjusted R
2
0.58 0.55 0.61 0.67 0.62 0.69
t-statistics for all variables are given in parentheses. We denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 
1% with *, ** and *** respectively. The LHS variable is the sum of FDI inflows and outflows (as % of 
GDP). Estimation using least squares with country fixed effects. For definitions of variables, see 
Appendix B. Two additional variables that are never significant in this specification for developing 
countries are a financial crisis dummy (CCBC) and a dummy for current account restrictions (CAR). 
CCBC is negative and significant for industrialized countries sample. 
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Trade openness in…  
(Average for t-1,…,t-4) 
























Akaike IC  4.81 1.90 2.43 2.98
Observations 635 318 283 254
Adjusted R
2 0.39 0.66 0.58 0.59
t-statistics for all variables are given in parentheses. We denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
with *, ** and *** respectively. The LHS variable is either FDI net inflows or net outflows (as % of GDP). 
Estimation using least squares with country fixed effects. For definitions of variables, see Appendix B.   4















































Financial openness in…  
(Average for t-1,…,t-4)   
















…equity  0.79** 
(2.12)
0.30 
(1.55)   





Akaike IC  7.22 5.27 7.05 5.31 
Observations 203 261 801 372 
Adjusted R
2 0.97 0.89 0.93 0.89 
t-statistics for all variables are given in parentheses. We denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 
1% with *, ** and *** respectively. The LHS variable is the sum of imports and exports of goods or 
services (as % of GDP). Estimation using least squares with country fixed effects with a correction for 
an autocorrelation (AR1). For definitions of variables, see Appendix B. Similar estimation for trade in 
services does not yield any significant coefficients for the financial flows variables. 
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Table 7. Decomposition of Causality – Full Sample 
  Percent of overall linear feedback
 a
  FDI gross flows  FDI net flows  FDI inflows 
From FDI openness to commercial 
openness (
FOC O F
→ )  50 58 57 
From commercial openness to FDI 
openness ( ) 
CO FO F
→
31 34 32 
Simultaneous feedback (
FOC O F
• )  19 8 11 
a Using the methodology outlined in Geweke (1982) and defined in equations (15)-(23). The overall 
linear feedback is defined in equation (20). 
 